Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of corporatism on wage, employment, and optimal trade policy in the context of international market share rivalry. A Striking result of the paper is that when an optimal (Nash)subsidy is in place, wages, employment and the level of the optimal export subsidy itself become independent of the degree of corporatism. This result breaks down under free trade or when domestic policy makers endogenize the foreign wage, yielding in the familiar negative relationship between the degree of corporatism and wages. [F13, J51]
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
