Abstract
AbstractAlthough attempts to introduce international regulation as a device to benefit cocoa producing countries have failed in the past five years, considerable pressure remains to try again. In this study, estimates are formed of the probable changes in some of the relevant variables if an international monopolistic cocoa pricing agreement were implemented. On the basis of new estimates of cocoa supply and demand relations, effects of the hypothetical institution of discriminatory monopolistic pricing in 1964 are examined. Such an agreement would have resulted in marginal, although possibly important, additions to the leading cocoa producing countries' command over external resources; but stock accumulation or surplus disposal problems might have been troublesome, and long‐run supplies would have increased substantially unless producers were effectively isolated from the world market.
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