Monnet's Error or Intergovernmental Triumph: Examining the Formation of the European Banking Union

Abstract

Are the grand theories of integration still relevant today and capable of describing integration in the European Union? Have the general principles of the grand theories lost their ability to accurately describe European integration? For policy makers and scholars that rely on theories, the answer to these questions are of axiomatic importance. Since 2012, steps towards a banking union provide the most contemporary and far reaching manifestation of European integration making the area ripe for studying these questions. Focusing on the member states of the Eurozone adds relevance to the discussion, because the grand theories should apply more adeptly to this more highly integrated group. To discern whether a single grand theory can account for present empirical findings, this paper relies upon a case study of the European banking union to test whether intergovernmentalism or neofunctionalism can properly account for evinced integrative outcomes. The grand theories will be tested to see if they are capable of explaining the entirety of the integration process within their own logical confines. Instead of an exhaustive approach that describes the preferences of each member state, coalitions will be curated to discern group negotiating preferences and taken alongside the actions of supranational actors to test the relevance of the grand theories of European integration.