Abstract
Provincial quasi-monies and fiscal federalism in Argentina Since July 2001, the Argentineans provinces emitted a large amount of quasi-monies. This manifestation of the structural difficulties rises from the imperfect organization of the Argentinean fiscal federalism. The separation of powers between the federal State and the provinces seems inadequate, since the provinces have an influence on the legitimate prerogatives of the federal authority. The excessive power of the provinces results in a recurring monetary competition which weakens the national currency and which is only the reflection of an institutional bursting. The notes, emitted by the provinces, provided a partial function of means of payment. One, however, could see in the quasi-monies, the solution to define the new monetary regime. It seems that those are misled. It would rather be necessary to tackle the institutional inconsistencies of the Argentinean federalism, to ensure the viability of the new monetary order. JEL classification : H77, E49, N16, D79
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