Abstract
We examine the collusion effects of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on corporate ESG performance. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for 2010–2020, we find that firms with MLS tend to have lower ESG performance than firms with a single large shareholder. This finding is robust to a series of robustness checks. Our conclusion is consistent with the common-benefit and cost-sharing hypothesis, where MLS shoulder the costs of poor ESG performance with the controlling shareholder and protect their common benefit through free-riding behavior.
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