Money and the Party Vote in State House Elections

Abstract

The research presented here is designed to answer some of the questions that remain regarding the impact of campaign expenditures on state legislative elections. Analysis of data from 12 states indicates that there is a significant relationship between campaign expenditures and the party vote in state house elections. The effect of expenditures conforms to the principle of diminishing marginal returns. The relationship, in several states, attains a level that make expenditures among the most important factors in state house races. Finally, the analysis uncovers both interstate and partisan differences in the importance of expenditures, a finding that opens up a whole new set of research questions. Because of low levels of voter information and interest, the lack of grassroots party organizations, the increased use of new and expensive campaign technology, and the increasing amount of money being spent to win legislative seats, it is reasonable to assume that campaign expenditures are an integral part of state legislative elections. Money buys access to voters. State legislative candidates who have money to spend are better able to affect the vote choice than are candidates for more visible offices (i.e., those that attract greater media attention) because they are not competing with conflicting information sources other than their opponent. The probable absence of free media time means that a candidate will get only the exposure that he or she pays for. Because voters are relatively poorly informed, they are unlikely to have as many predispositions in state legislative races as in more salient races, making it easier for candidates with money to influence their vote. The erosion of the political party as a voting cue and as an organization means that candidates have a better opportunity to reach more voters, but only if they have the finances to build