Abstract

An important recent strand of literature has shown that if wages are set strategically by inflation-averse, non-atomistic unions then equilibrium employment is sensitive to the monetary regime. This note demonstrates that such sensitivity need not reflect a direct aversion to inflation by unions, but instead may result from union concerns for employment objectives in circumstances in which the variance and mean value of inflation are positively related.

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