Abstract
ABSTRACT Independent central banks are major centres of unelected power in contemporary capitalist societies. While critics allege that they are incompatible with democratic values, defenders argue that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank is an important policy tool elected institutions may use to credibly commit to low inflation. This paper defends a moderate view that neither requires dismantling central bank independence nor turns a blind eye to its risks for the proper functioning of a democratic regime. It proposes a set of concrete constitutional rules that limit central bank power while allowing it to serve its core function.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
