Molotov: A Biography by Derek s> Watson (review)

Abstract

768 SEER, 84, 4, 2006 districts,as well as provinces. Her arguments are not always clear, but her statisticalanalysisof unrestand engagement with the local zemstva show that peasants were worried about the changes prompted by modernization. This fuelled a mixture of unrest and petitions depending on backgroundsand conditions . Airapetov's study of the military in Manchuria, despite its focus on General Alekseev,has much to say about poor conditions,fallingmorals,lack of an effectivecommand structureand the impact of the revolution.The latter two factors seriously affected officers such as Alekseev, who quickly became disillusionedwith senior officers and the tsarist authorities. This disillusionment lingered and helps explain why many officers quickly abandoned Nicholas II during similarunrest in FebruaryI9I7. This edited volume, therefore, perfectly complements Ascher's concise account of I905 and illustratesthe wealth of opportunitiesfor furtherstudy of 1905 in a variety of areas. Whereas Ascher has succeeded in providing an excellent introduction to events, Smele and Heywood's volume displays the fruits of a range of important new research. Readers could do much worse than read these two volumes in tandem. School of Historical Studies MATTHEW RENDLE University ofNewcastle uponTyne Watson, Derek. Molotov: A Biography. Studies in Russian and East European History and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstokeand New York, 2005. xx + 376 pp. Glossary. Illustrations.Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Indexes. ?6s.oo. THIS ambitious and impressivebook, the first serious historicalbiography of Molotov, adds considerablyto our knowledge of Soviet political history.Like many of the figuresaround Stalin, Molotov has often been studied more for what he tells us about Stalin himself than in his own terms;and a paucity of sources have meant that it was hard to assess his significance. However, in recent years more and more has come to be known about Molotov: Stalin's Letters toMolotov (New Haven, CT, I995), for example, showed his importance to the formationof Soviet policy in the late I92oS; and FeliksChuev's conversations with him, published in English as MolotovRemembers (Chicago, IL, I993),portrayeda man who continuedtojustifyStalinisminto his old age. Yet there was a need for someone to gather all the threads together and assess Molotov in his own right. This Watson has done with great thoroughness, and the Molotov that emerges turns out to be a man who played a very importantrole in shaping the Stalinistsystem. In spite of Lenin's damning description of him as the 'best filing clerk in Russia', Molotov rose to power quickly:he became head of Sovnarkom in December 1930 when he was only forty. Watson describesthis rise in detail, and the development of Molotov's relationshipwith Stalin. Intriguingly,after the FebruaryrevolutionMolotov was more radical and closer to the Leninist position than Stalin. By the early I920s, however, the political relationship between the two men had solidified.Watson notes that Molotov was an ideal lieutenant, and an excellent trouble-shooter;he needed a strong leader, and REVIEWS 769 he found one in Stalin. At the same time, he was also attractedby extreme measuresand radicalpolicies:even during the Civil War he endorsed terror; and he was a personal enthusiast for the policy of collectivization. I. N. Smirnov, condemned in early 1933 for being part of an 'anti-partygroup', stated that Molotov was the leader of the left-wing of the Stalinist bureaucracy, and a man opposed to any retreat on collectivization and industrialization. As SovietforeignministerfromI939 to I949, Molotovdevelopeda formidable reputation as a negotiator. He remained, of course, Stalin's obedient servant:in late I939 a Finnish negotiator stated that he 'acted like an automaton [.. .] as though he were merely executing someone else's orders' (P. I76).Yet, throughWatson'sstudy,it is possibleto discernthat Molotov had views and methods of his own. He was, for example, always a sceptic about the West: his pro-German sympathies certainly smoothed the way for the Nazi-Soviet Pact; and after I945 he was constantlysuspiciousof the Western allies.He had varioustacticsfor gettingwhat he wanted:he would sometimes slow down negotiationsby concentratingon proceduralissues;and he sought to exploit differencesbetween the USA and Britain. In addition, he tried to manipulatethe weaknessesof his diplomaticopponents:for example, he 'capitalisedon Byrnes'habit of speaking"offthe cuff' by askinghim to clarifyand explain, hoping for mistakes,and on Bevin's quicknessof temper...