Molar and molecular views of choice

Abstract

The molar and molecular views of behavior are not different theories or levels of analysis; they are different paradigms. The molecular paradigm views behavior as composed of discrete units (responses) occurring at moments in time and strung together in chains to make up complex performances. The discrete pieces are held together as a result of association by contiguity. The molecular view has a long history both in early thought about reflexes and in associationism, and, although it was helpful to getting a science of behavior started, it has outlived its usefulness. The molar view stems from a conviction that behavior is continuous, as argued by John Dewey, Gestalt psychologists, Karl Lashley, and others. The molar paradigm views behavior as inherently extended in time and composed of activities that have integrated parts. In the molar paradigm, activities vary in their scale of organization—i.e., as to whether they are local or extended—and behavior may be controlled sometimes by short-term relations and sometimes by long-term relations. Applied to choice, the molar paradigm rests on two simple principles: (a) all behavior constitutes choice; and (b) all activities take time. Equivalence between choice and behavior occurs because every situation contains more than one alternative activity. The principle that behavior takes time refers not simply to any notion of response duration, but to the necessity that identifying one action or another requires a sample extended in time. The molecular paradigm’s momentary responses are inferred from extended samples in retrospect. In this sense, momentary responses constitute abstractions, whereas extended activities constitute concrete particulars. Explanations conceived within the molecular paradigm invariably involve hypothetical constructs, because they require causes to be contiguous with responses. Explanations conceived within the molar paradigm retain direct contact with observable variables.