Abstract
Conceptual analysis in the Brentano school is not based on a form of conceptual atomism, and is in that sense different from more standard accounts of conceptual analysis. A concept like illusion is understood by Husserl in terms of perception and an operation of modification; in a similar way one can understand the idea of merely thinking as a modification of the act of judgement. The Husserlian idea of modification has its origin within the Brentano School in an interest in the logical-linguistic phenomenon of expressions containing modifying terms, like ‘toy-duck’ or ‘false gold’. The paper shows the philosophical significance of the idea of modification in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. It ends with a first proposal for a phenomenological account of modification.
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