Modified Shapley Value-Based Profit Allocation Method for Wind Power Accommodation and Deep Peak Regulation of Thermal Power

Abstract

Peak regulation ancillary service plays a significant role in the safe and economic operation of power system with high wind energy penetration. However, the interest conflict in wind power accommodation and thermal power schedule results in insufficient initiative for peak regulation service. To promote the initiative for peak regulation service, the paper is devoted to formulating an effective interest guarantee scheme. First, we introduce the deep peak regulation optimization model of wind power and thermal power based on cooperative game theory. Next, considering cooperative fairness and the encouragement to coalition improvement, a novel profit allocation method is specially modified based on Shapley value. The ratio of deep peak regulation ability and demand (ADR) is introduced to recognize the main limiting reason of current coalition and overcome the short-sight of original Shapley value allocation method. Since the parameters are adjustable according to the specific pursuit, modified Shapley value method for profit allocation can be regarded as the comprehensiveness of the original Shapley value method for profit allocation and cost allocation. Finally, numerical study clarifies the effectiveness of modified Shapley value method with ADR.