Abstract
A composite detection technique against stealthy data manipulations is developed in this paper for distribution networks that are low observable. Attack detection strategies typically rely on state estimation which becomes challenging when limited measurements are available. In this paper, a modified matrix completion approach provides estimates of the system state and its error variances for the locations in the network where measurements are unavailable. Using the error statistics and their corresponding state estimates, bad data detection can be carried out using the chi-squared test. The proposed approach employs a moving target defence strategy (MTD) where the network parameters are perturbed through distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices such that stealthy data manipulation attacks can be exposed in the form of bad data. Thus, the bad data detection approach developed in this paper can detect stealthy attacks using the MTD strategy. This technique is implemented on 37-bus and 123-bus three-phase unbalanced distribution networks to demonstrate the attack detection accuracy even for a low observable system.
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