Modernisation, reaction and Muhammad Ali's ‘Empire’

Abstract

The authority and power of the Ottoman central government rapidly declined in the second part of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The attempt of Salim III to halt this progress by introducing reforms ended with tragedy and strengthened the reactionary power groups in the centre of the Empire and in the provinces. Matters remained at a standstill until about 1826 when Mahmud II felt sufficiently strong to tackle the major reactionary elements in the Empire. Among the valis who tried to consolidate their autonomy at the expense of the central government, Muhammad Ali of Egypt was exceptional. Not only was he able and successful, but he also realised the need for, and the benefits of modernisation and reform, and as soon as he felt secure in his position, he began to implement them. Notwithstanding his caution, he was nearly overthrown in 1815 by a rebellion of his mercenary troops, who were supported by other traditional elements and were incited, it seems, by the Ottomans when he attempted to organise a modern army on European lines (Nizdm-i-Jedid). True to his class, he despised the Egyptians and continued to base his government and army on the 'foreign' Muslim, mainly TurkoAlbanian-Circassian 'aristocracy'. But the lesson to Muhammad Ali of events of 1815 was invaluable. He was determined to get rid of the traditional troops and in the interim to keep them as far as possible from the vital parts of his government. He became even more determined to safeguard his autonomy and to limit Ottoman influence and patronage, as far as possible, in areas under his control. In addition to Egypt, the area in which this policy was first apparent was Arabia. The Hijaz was historically connected to Egypt and economically dependant on it.' Yet, despite the prestige attached to the protection of the Haramayn it was more of a liability than an asset. But control of the Hijaz was a springboard for Muhammad Ali's expansionism in the Arabian Peninsula and along the coasts of the Red Sea, motivated by his empire-building ambitions and the wish to carve for himself part of the Indian Ocean trade. Egyptian activities in this direction coincided, however, with the British government's growing awareness of the importance of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf for 'imperial communications'. The British already refused in 181 1 to sell Muhammad Ali a frigate for service in the Red Sea because they feared the adverse effects of 'the extension of Turkish influence in that part of the world'.2 At the close of the second decade of the nineteenth century they watched with apprehension Egypt's advance in Yemen and to the coast of the upper part of the Persian Gulf. British activities in the Persian Gulf and in Yemen in this period evoked Egyptian protests in the name of the Porte and were partly the cause for Muhammad Ali's attempt to extend his government along both sides of the Red Sea as far as Aden in Arabia and Berbera in Somalia.3 Notwithstanding, Muhammad Ali tried to avoid any confrontation with the British and explained to British representatives that he was complying with instructions of the Porte.4 Despite his protestations of innocence the ground