Modern views on motor skill learning are not ‘representative’!

Abstract

Approaches to the explanation of (motor) behaviour deriving from basic Cybernetic principles are contrasted with that based on Skinner's principle of operant conditioning. The reliance of the former on systems of representation (comparators, transducers, schemas etc.), not open to observation, is shown to give rise to a number of theoretical and applied problems. While Skinner's approach is shown to avoid such assumptions it is, in turn, limited in the explanations it provides for behavioural change by its undue emphasis on why things are done at the expense of how they are done. It is argued that recent developments in Ecological Psychology, particularly dynamical systems approaches, provide novel solutions to the question of how things are done but, in so doing, lose track of the why. In spite of the limitations of either perspective on its own, there does seem to be sufficient (fundamental) communality and complementarity to provide the basis for a rapprochement that can lead to a better understanding of behaviour in general and motor behaviour in particular.