Modern Metaphysics, Dangerous Truth, Post-Moral Ethics

Abstract

So, what is the final word on the celebrated analytic philosopher Bernard William's final work, Truth and Truthfulness'} Is it, as The Economist contended in an otherwise admiring obituary, so obviously the swan-song of sick man that reviewers forbore draw attention its faults?1 Was Thomas Nagel right-despite his warm observation that virtuoso blend of analytic philosophy, classical scholarship, historical consciousness, and uninhibited curiosity marks Truth and Truthfulness unmistakably as work by Bernard Williams-that Truth and Truthfulness constitutes a very strange project, for it attempts bizarre, impossible twist on Nietzsche, trying derive intrinsic moral values from wholly materialist, wholly historicist genealogy of morals?2 Is it the case, as an Ethics review concluded, tiiat Truth and Truthfulness is disappointing in its treatment of truth as opposed myth, or perhaps interpretation?3 And is this not tragic if it is true, as the review also contends, that for ingenuity, provocativeness, breadth of knowledge, and sharp, elegant, highly memorable writing, there is no one touch Williams? And, given that the explicit ambition of Truth and Truthfulness was defeat dangerous deniers like Richard Rorty-Williams' prime named nemesis - is it not tragic when Barry Allen, in an otherwise highly respectful essay in History and Theory, is nonetheless forced devastating conclusion: Williams think that being serious about trudifulness requires being serious about truth, in sense that goes beyond due concern for accuracy and sincerity, neither of which presuppose anything beyond contingent discursive practice. He think that being serious about truth requires acknowledging standard transcending the contingent consensus of cultural politics. That is why Rorty 's pragmatism is so wickedly wrong. Yet there is no argument for either assumption in this book, which on this point must look Rorty as fifty percent missing the point (no pragmatist denies the value of truthfulness), and fifty percent begging the question.4 Is it not tragic when Allen's conclusion is echoed in Theological Studies review which, though it applauds Williams' care and honesty, calls for sharper positions and takes Williams task for sophomoric oversight, namely, of attempting to consider truth and truthfulness without ever entering the debates about the notion of truth itself'?5 In sum, does, swan-song of sick man constitute our most generous response Truth and Truthfulness! Or, is something more subtle and far more significant going on? This essay argues that Truth and Truthfulness makes clear that Williams, moving rigorously within analytic philosophical parameters, has long, though not without ambiguity, been traveling along Nietzschean trajectory. The reading advanced here is slightly strong, insofar as it moves beyond any orienting framework ever explicitly and unambiguously suggested by Williams. But the extensive use of Williams' own words should make clear that the conclusions are not unduly forced-and in their light it becomes clear that Williams' final work is no faltering swan-song, but brilliant strategic effort designed, for socio-political reasons, confound straightforward reading. More significantly, this essay attempts delineate profound but largely unarticulated philosophical consensus among Western philosophers typically considered be in almost wholesale opposition. For instance, it will become clear that the often fierce feud between Williams and Rorty is spate between close philosophical siblings. Indeed, contrary common misperception, it should become clear that the sole remaining disagreement Williams has with Rorty concerns what Williams takes be Rorty's naive faith in truth. Williams: Ethical Realist Williams is frequently read as an ethical realist. It is in this vein that Allen in History and Theory concluded that Williams seems think that being serious about truth requires acknowledging standard transcending the contingent consensus of cultural politics. …