Abstract
This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen's views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism (or at least homomorphism) between the representor and what is represented is a universal necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation. Secondly, I argue that the so-called "semantic" or "model-theoretic" construal of theories does not give proper due to the role played by true propositions in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force of van Fraassen's pragmatic - and antirealist - "dissolution" of the "loss of reality objection" loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about them.
Highlights
REPRESENTATION1.1 Fundamental Definitions According to the so-called “semantic” - or better “model-theoretic”
In his recent - and magnificent - book on scientific representation (2008) Bas van Fraassen examines important but often neglected aspects of various kinds of representation in different areas of human practice - such as art, caricature and cartography - and shows their relevance for understanding how scientific representation works
In the course of these austere reflections, I have been trying to show that our successful representations always rest on some morphism that we establish between concrete structures
Summary
1.1 Fundamental Definitions According to the so-called “semantic” - or better “model-theoretic”. The existence of an isomorphism between structures implies that their second-order properties are identical. In the case of isomorphism between concrete structures we do not in general have identity of form since the specific relations taken into account in the respective domains may be different. The construction of a representative function between two concrete (as opposed to mathematical) structures always involves some abstraction: not all properties and relations are taken into account. Scientists often stress the representative role of models In this second sense, models are the possible representors of structures similar to them. Sentation is partial or incomplete when some properties and relations of the representor and the represented are disregarded as the result of abstraction, which is always the case outside pure mathematics
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