Abstract

We discuss two inter-related puzzling features of the literature on a priori voting power. First, the mathematical model used in virtually all this literature does not recognize abstention as an option distinct from both a ‘yes’ and a ‘no’ vote. Second, real-life decision rules of voting bodies—in particular the US legislature and the UN Security Council—are misrepresented as though they did not allow abstention as a tertium quid. We suggest that these misrepresentations may be examples of what philosophers of science call ’theory-laden observation’.KeywordsDecision RuleSecurity CouncilVote BehaviourVote PowerWinning CoalitionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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