Abstract
I explain why, within the nonclassical framework for cognitive science we describe in the book, cognitive‐state transitions can fail to be tractably computable even if they are subserved by a discrete dynamical system whose mathematical‐state transitions are tractably computable. I distinguish two ways that cognitive processing might conform to programmable rules in which all operations that apply to representation‐level structure are primitive, and two corresponding constraints on models of cognition. Although Litch is correct in maintaining that classical cognitive science is not committed to the first constraint, it is committed to the second. This fact constitutes an illuminating gloss on our claim that one foundational assumption of classicism is that human cognition conforms to programmable, representation‐level, rules.
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