Modelling the effects of trade-offs between long and short-term objectives in fisheries management

Abstract

Fisheries management is typically a complex problem, from both an environmental and political perspective. The main source of conflict occurs between the need for stock conservation and the need for fishing community well-being, which is typically measured by employment and income levels. For most fisheries, overexploitation of the stock requires a reduction in the level of fishing activity. While this may lead to long-term benefits (both conservation and economic), it also leads to a short-term reduction in employment and regional incomes. In regions which are heavily dependent on fisheries, short-term consequences of conservation efforts may be considerable. The relatively high degree of scientific uncertainty with respect to the status of the stocks and the relatively short lengths of political terms of office, generally give rise to the short-run view taking the highest priority when defining policy objectives. In this paper, a multi-objective model of the North Sea is developed that incorporates both long-term and short-term objectives. Optimal fleet sizes are estimated taking into consideration different preferences between the defined short-term and long-term objectives. The subsequent results from the model give the short-term and long-term equilibrium status of the fishery incorporating the effects of the short-term objectives. As would be expected, an optimal fleet from a short-term perspective is considerably larger than an optimal fleet from a long-run perspective. Conversely, stock sizes and sustainable yields are considerably lower in the long-term if a short-term perspective is used in setting management policies. The model results highlight what is essentially a principal-agent problem, with the objectives of the policy makers not necessarily reflecting the objectives of society as a whole.