Abstract
The dynamics of a spreadable disease are largely governed by four factors: proactive vaccination, retroactive treatment, individual decisions, and the prescribing behaviour of physicians. Under the imposed vaccination policy and antiviral treatment in society, complex factors (costs and expected effects of the vaccines and treatments, and fear of being infected) trigger an emulous situation in which individuals avoid infection by the pre-emptive or ex post provision. Aside from the established voluntary vaccination game, we propose a treatment game model associated with the resistance evolution of antiviral/antibiotic overuse. Moreover, the imperfectness of vaccinations has inevitably led to anti-vaccine behaviour, necessitating a proactive treatment policy. However, under the excessively heavy implementation of treatments such as antiviral medicine, resistant strains emerge. The model explicitly exhibits a dual social dilemma situation, in which the treatment behaviour changes on a local time scale, and the vaccination uptake later evolves on a global time scale. The impact of resistance evolution and the coexistence of dual dilemmas are investigated by the control reproduction number and the social efficiency deficit, respectively. Our investigation might elucidate the substantial impacts of both vaccination and treatment in the framework of epidemic dynamics, and hence suggest the appropriate use of antiviral treatment.
Highlights
The appearance of epidemiological dynamics in the mechanism of pre-emptive voluntary vaccination has been studied in various contexts [1], such as perfect and imperfect vaccination [2,3], dynamical behaviour of vaccination [4], vaccination with information spreading [5], metapopulation migration modelling [6] and heterogeneous networks [7]
To handle these two provisions working on different time scales, our model implants the second social dilemma incurred by the antiviral treatment rather than the so-called vaccination dilemma acquired by the proactive provision
This paper developed an SITR/V epidemic model that combines the effects of proactive vaccination and retroactive treatment on the control and prevention of infectious viral diseases
Summary
The appearance of epidemiological dynamics in the mechanism of pre-emptive voluntary vaccination has been studied in various contexts [1], such as perfect and imperfect vaccination [2,3], dynamical behaviour of vaccination [4], vaccination with information spreading [5], metapopulation migration modelling [6] and heterogeneous networks [7]. Overuse of antiviral treatment and prescribing behaviour can trigger the emergence of resistant strains, encouraging more ex post provision activity by individuals To handle these two provisions working on different time scales, our model implants the second social dilemma incurred by the antiviral treatment rather than the so-called vaccination dilemma acquired by the proactive provision. We emphasize the social learning behaviour for prescription of antiviral treatment under the evolutionary dynamics of resistance that can uphold the optimal use of the treatment To explore this evolutionary process of vaccination and treatment, we impose three strategy update rules: individual-based risk assessment (IB-RA), society-based risk assessment (SB-RA) and direct commitment (DC). To model the social dual-dilemma as a two-stage game, the pre-emptive vaccination and ex post treatment are developed in the framework of SIR epidemic dynamics in a well-mixed population
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More From: Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
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