Abstract

BackgroundMost poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation, which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission. Previous simple models based on hypothetical populations assumed perfect detection of symptomatic cases and suggested the need to observe no paralytic cases from wild polioviruses (WPVs) for approximately 3-4 years to achieve 95% confidence about eradication, but the complexities in real populations and the imperfect nature of surveillance require consideration.MethodsWe revisit the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation using a more comprehensive model that reflects the conditions in a number of places with different characteristics related to WPV transmission, and we model the actual environmental WPV detection that occurred in Israel in 2013. We consider the analogous potential for undetected transmission of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses. The model explicitly accounts for the impact of different vaccination activities before and after the last detected case of paralytic polio, different levels of surveillance, variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence among serotypes, and the possibility of asymptomatic participation in transmission by previously-vaccinated or infected individuals.ResultsWe find that prolonged circulation in the absence of cases and thus undetectable by case-based surveillance may occur if vaccination keeps population immunity close to but not over the threshold required for the interruption of transmission, as may occur in northwestern Nigeria for serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus in the event of insufficient tOPV use. Participation of IPV-vaccinated individuals in asymptomatic fecal-oral transmission may also contribute to extended transmission undetectable by case-based surveillance, as occurred in Israel. We also find that gaps or quality issues in surveillance could significantly reduce confidence about actual disruption. Maintaining high population immunity and high-quality surveillance for several years after the last detected polio cases will remain critical elements of the polio end game.ConclusionsCountries will need to maintain vigilance in their surveillance for polioviruses and recognize that their risks of undetected circulation may differ as a function of their efforts to manage population immunity and to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12879-015-0791-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Highlights

  • Most poliovirus infections occur with no symptoms and this leads to the possibility of silent circulation, which complicates the confirmation of global goals to permanently end poliovirus transmission

  • The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) expects to coordinate the cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use after global eradication of Wild poliovirus (WPV) to minimize the risks associated with live polioviruses (LPVs, i.e., WPVs, Vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV), OPVs, and OPV-related viruses) [4,14]

  • We model populations with relatively recent WPV transmission that rely on Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance and the actual environmental surveillance detection of WPV serotype 1 (WPV1) that occurred in Israel in 2013 [44]

Read more

Summary

Methods

We build on our understanding of poliovirus surveillance and prior comprehensive poliovirus infection transmission models [7,20,41,42,43] to estimate the confidence about (probability of ) no circulation in each modeled population as a function of the time since the last detected event. TUCx% - The xth percentile of the TUC (i.e., TUC95%, TUC99%) For this analysis, we focus on detected-events (i.e., detecting cases from AFP surveillance and positive isolates that indicated the presence of infections from environmental surveillance) and the DEFP instead of the case-free period used previously [18,19] to account for the different information provided by the two components of poliovirus surveillance used. Area, depending on the situation-specific assumptions (Table 1, details on methods and assumptions provided in the Additional file 1)

Results
Conclusions
Background
Discussion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call