Modeling for Driver Decision-Making Behavior during Amber Signal Time at Intersection

Abstract

The current traffic lights are composed of red, amber, and green, and it is controversial that the drivers’ behavior choices and the content of the relevant laws & regulations during the amber timing. From the current situation with the signal intersection, the amber light time and the red clearance aren’t differentiate, usually the amber light time acts as red clearance. It will not improve the traffic operating efficiency of the intersection, but bring more traffic conflicts, if the role of the amber light time returns to academic research, which the amber is a warning signal. The paper analyzes the process that the drivers choose stopping by slowing down or passing by maintaining the speed during amber time from the vehicle dynamic characteristics. And then, the generalized amber interval dilemma is defined to establish the mixed-strategy game theory model, which reveals the utility of the driver and signal manager in the amber interval, and the algorithm of Nash Equilibrium point is also research focus. According to Nash Equilibrium, the optimal solution of the game theory model is (acceleration, amber setting) or (deceleration, amber canceling).