Modeling Discretion in American Sentencing Systems

Abstract

Sentencing structures in American jurisdictions have become extraordinarily diverse in the past twenty‐five years. Any one punishment structure, such as the federal sentencing guidelines system, the guidelines system of a particular state, or the indeterminate sentencing plan still followed in many states, contains layers of complexity and a multiplicity of decision makers who hold discretion over sentencing outcomes. Increasingly, conceptual tools are needed to analyze and evaluate the similarities and differences across many systems. The author develops basic theoretical tools to describe the building blocks of various up‐and‐running sentencing structures, with close attention to the permutations of discretions that add up to define sentencing outcomes. Such basic conceptual tools can facilitate observations about single systems and can enable comparative analyses of numerous systems. Further, the author suggests that there are both descriptive and normative principles that can be applied to the structural machinery of sentencing systems. With increasing experience, we are learning that some such innovations work better than others.