Abstract
ABSTRACT Our daily life is full of various forms of security warnings. But do they have enough effect on people's behavior, and how can the government improve its domestic warning system? The purpose of this article is to develop a model to help examine the trade-offs inherent in issuing security warnings and identify optimal timing for warning issuance. We develop a formal dynamic model of security-based warning systems. Then we conduct several simulation-based analyses. We show that optimal policies for warning issuance are sensitive to two major behavioral characteristics of the society: how fast people might start ignoring warnings, and how adversaries perceive such ignorance. The results show that an underestimation of these effects can result in sub-optimal solutions and performance shortfall. In addition, methodologically, the article provides an example of how to use simulation techniques for theory development in public management and policy. [Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of International Public Management Journal for the following free supplemental resource: online appendix.]
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