Abstract
BackgroundPrevious experiments in tacit coordination games hinted that some people are more successful in achieving coordination than others, although the variability in this ability has not yet been examined before. With that in mind, the overarching aim of our study is to model and describe the variability in human decision-making behavior in the context of tacit coordination games.MethodsIn this study, we conducted a large-scale experiment to collect behavioral data, characterized the distribution of tacit coordination ability, and modeled the decision-making behavior of players. First, we measured the multimodality in the data and described it by using a Gaussian mixture model. Then, using multivariate linear regression and dimensionality reduction (PCA), we have constructed a model linking between individual strategic profiles of players and their coordination ability. Finally, we validated the predictive performance of the model by using external validation.ResultsWe demonstrated that coordination ability is best described by a multimodal distribution corresponding to the levels of coordination ability and that there is a significant relationship between the player’s strategic profile and their coordination ability. External validation determined that our predictive model is robust.ConclusionsThe study provides insight into the amount of variability that exists in individual tacit coordination ability as well as in individual strategic profiles and shows that both are quite diverse. Our findings may facilitate the construction of improved algorithms for human–machine interaction in diverse contexts. Additional avenues for future research are discussed.
Highlights
Previous experiments in tacit coordination games hinted that some people are more successful in achieving coordination than others, the variability in this ability has not yet been examined before
3 Results Before examination of the results pertaining to the individual coordination ability (iCA) scores and the strategic profiles, it is important to demonstrate that the players were motivated to coordinate with the other unknown partner, that is, that a solution in each of the games was not randomly selected
5 Conclusions In summary, in this study we investigated the distribution of individual coordination ability in tacit coordination games and constructed a predictive model based on the individual strategic profiles of the players
Summary
Previous experiments in tacit coordination games hinted that some people are more successful in achieving coordination than others, the variability in this ability has not yet been examined before. A tacit coordination game is one in which two individuals are rewarded for making the same choice from the same set of alternatives, and any form of communication between the players is not allowed or not possible (e.g., [1,2,3,4]). Such problems have been formally modeled in game theory as games with multiple Nash equilibria solutions with equal values [5]. The game-theoretical framework fails to explain people’s decisions in such games [1], mostly because the problem of deciding between multiple Nash equilibria, which is one of the major challenges
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