Model of social inference processes.

Abstract

This article presents a new model of inference processes in the social perceiver, along with the basis of the model in prior experimental results and in the ACT* cognitive theory. The two stages of the model involve different types of processing: interpretive versus procedural. In the first stage, an inference is performed by general, domain-independent processes guided by a learned inference rule that is selected from long-term memory. In the second, procedural stage, after much experience with a particular inferential domain, an inference process is selected without explicit search, based on a pattern match to the current goal and knowledge state. The inference becomes automatic. Existing experimental evidence supports predictions of the model in both the attribution and attitude domains. Insights and findings of current approaches to inference, including information integration and judgmental heuristics, can be encompassed within the new model in a natural way. Directions for future research applying the model are discussed. Social inferences—those involving attributions, other beliefs, and attitudes—are intrinsic components of many processes of interest to social and cognitive psychologists, including person perception, social judgment, causal attribution, language comprehension, and attitude formation and change (cf. Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). This article presents a new model of social inference processes, based on a general theory of cognitive structure and processes and on recent results in social psychology. Existing theoretical approaches to social inference fall into three general categories (Hastie, 1983): Information Integration Theory (N. H. Anderson, 1981), judgmental heuristics (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), and information-processing models (Wyer & Srull, 1980). The relationship of the new model to these current approaches is discussed later in the article. However, current