Model-Measurement Data Integrity Attacks

Abstract

The vulnerabilities of information and communica-tion technology (ICT) infrastructures leave room for cyber attacks threatening the reliable operations of power systems. Based on the real-world evidence of the Ukraine power grid attack and the pop-ular technical discussion that cyber attacks could be launched at the control-center level, this paper reveals a new attack strategy: model-measurement data integrity (MMI) attack. Instead of com-promising measurements only, we investigate the possibility where network parameters are coordinately manipulated when con-structing false data injection attack (FDIA) vectors. Furthermore, we model cyber adversaries possible behavior of co-planning the manipulated measurement channels and parameter attack vectors prior to the launch of FDIAs. The revealed MMI attack strategy allows a drastic reduction of measurement channels to compro-mise in run-time for keeping the stealth property. Simulations in the IEEE 14-bus test system and the IEEE 118-bus test system demonstrate the feasibility of the revealed MMI attack strategy.