Model-Based Verification of Security and Non-Functional Behavior using AADL

Abstract

Modeling of system quality attributes, including security, is often done with low fidelity software models and disjointed architectural specifications by various engineers using their own specialized notations. These models are typically not maintained or documented throughout the life cycle and make it difficult to obtain a system view. However, a single-source architecture model of the system that is annotated with analysis-specific information allows changes to the architecture to be reflected in the various analysis models with little effort. We describe how model-based development using the Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) and compatible analysis tools provides the platform for multi-dimensional, multi-fidelity analysis and verification. A special emphasis is given to analysis approaches using Bell-LaPadula, Biba, and MILS approaches to security and that enable a system designer to exercise various architectural design options for confidentiality and data integrity prior to system realization.