Modalities of monitoring: Evidence from cameras and recorders in policing

Abstract

All policy implementation environments that transfer authority to field agents incur principal-agency problems. Given the difficulty of choosing the right agent (solving the “adverse selection” problem), leaders of agencies look for ways to reduce “moral hazard” when agents take actions against the public interest. Increasingly, leaders try to reduce moral hazard by monitoring employees using data collection technologies. Cameras and recorders are examples of sensors – devices for collecting and transmitting multiple modalities of physical phenomena. We focus on cameras and recorders as mixtures of modalities of monitoring using policing data in the United States. Policing agencies use different mechanisms such as training and policies to reduce moral hazard by officers. We show that those mechanisms are associated with the use of different sensor modalities – but not all mechanisms are associated with all modalities. We also show that statistical models should account for the use of mixtures of different technologies.