Modal Theory of Constitution and the Ontology of Persons

Abstract

Modal constitution theory is one of the most influential solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence, and the problem of personal identity. It rests on three fundamental premises: common-sense objects exist; sometimes objects coincide in space; the coincidence of objects in space requires explanation. In this article, the author offers a critique of the modal theory of constitution. First, the definition of the constitution is examined and a new argument is offered that modal theory either does not provide asymmetry of the constitution or leads to an infinite series of constitutive objects, unsatisfactorily extending ontology. Also, the author demonstrates that possible additions to the constitutive definition, which can make the definition sufficient for asymmetric relation, lead to additional theoretical difficulties, leading to the logical impossibility of constitution relation. Second, the author demonstrates that the theory of constitution offers an unsatisfactory theory of identity because it faces three problems: the overpopulation problem, the epistemic problem, and the personal problem. All of these considerations lead the author to conclude that modal constitution theory is not metaphysically satisfactory.