Abstract

Recent epistemology of modality has seen a growing trend towards metaphysics-first approaches. Contrastingly, this paper offers a more philosophically modest account of justifying modal claims, focusing on the practices of scientific modal inferences. Two ways of making such inferences are identified and analyzed: actualist-manipulationist modality (AM) and relative modality (RM). In AM, what is observed to be or not to be the case in actuality or under manipulations, allows us to make modal inferences. AM-based inferences are fallible, but the same holds for practically all empirical inquiry. In RM, modal inferences are evaluated relative to what is kept fixed in a system, like a theory or a model. RM-based inferences are more certain but framework-dependent. While elements from both AM and RM can be found in some existing accounts of modality, it is worth highlighting them in their own right and isolating their features for closer scrutiny. This helps to establish their relevant epistemologies that are free from some strong philosophical assumptions often attached to them in the literature. We close by showing how combining these two routes amounts to a view that accounts for a rich variety of modal inferences in science.

Highlights

  • The epistemology of modality1 has been one of the prevailing themes in contemporary philosophy

  • Based on prevalent scientific practice, we show that there is an important bridge between these two routes to making modal inferences: usually, what is kept fixed in a given system, especially in scientific investigation, is informed by what is discovered earlier through manipulations

  • We have presented in this paper a two-pronged epistemology of modal inferences, one based on an actualist-manipulationist (AM) method and the other on relative modality (RM)

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Summary

Introduction

The epistemology of modality has been one of the prevailing themes in contemporary philosophy (see, e.g., Fischer & Leon, 2017; Divers, 2002; Hale, 2013; Mallozzi, 1The epistemology of modality is often called “modal epistemology” (see, e.g., Fischer & Leon, 2017). While there has been a recent interest amongst philosophers of science to understand the modal dimension of inquiry in areas like biology, physics, and scientific modeling practices (e.g., GrüneYanoff, 2013; Koskinen, 2017; Massimi, 2019; Verreault-Julien, 2019), the aim of this paper is to provide a more general “all-purpose” epistemology of scientific modality This includes especially so-called natural or nomological modalities, and logical, epistemic, and possibly other types. In scientific modelling, relative modalities suggest places for future manipulations in the world, leading to an iterative process of modal reasoning and the refinement of further modal inferences Together, this amounts to a view that accounts for a rich variety of modal inferences in science without the need to commit to strong philosophical doctrines.

Setting the stage
Actualist-manipulationist modal inferences
Relative modality and inference-making
The relationship between the two epistemologies
Conclusions
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