Abstract
We analyze couples mode choice, focusing on the interdependence of spouses’ decisions. We set up a discrete collective (cooperative) model in which spouses with competing objectives reach a Pareto optimal decision, and we apply it to Paris region. We estimate the determinants of the bargaining power (spouses’ age, nationality, type of job contract, tenure status and number of children) using this collective model. To control for the endogeneity of car ownership, we finally model the joint choice of car ownership and mode. Econometric estimations show that spouses’ values of time driving alone and together are significantly different.
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