Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between leaders and ordinary shepherds among the raikas—nomadic shepherds from western India. It uses a neo-institutional perspective to show how control over information is crucial if shepherds are to prevent their leader from misusing the extensive powers he possesses to make decisions on their behalf. Control over information is not, however, sufficient. The paper argues that shepherds must also possess the capacity to impose sanctions if their leader oversteps the bounds of delegated decision-making authority. The paper highlights the importance of politics and the divergent interests of the shepherds and their leaders. In so doing, it allows inquiry into a system of social interactions that is characterized by conflicting interests and the negotiation of conflict, but is often perceived as harmonious. At the same time, the investigation offers new insights into other social situations structured by principal-agent relationships.
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