Abstract
At the present time and in most developed countries, EBIs/ESOs are regulated by a myriad of laws at the local, state and federal levels. This introduces complexity and conflicts, and greater transaction costs, and opportunities for forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage. This article analyzes the efficiency of legal processes for misconduct pertaining to Non-Common-Stock Equity-Based Incentives (“EBIs”); and also introduces new theories pertaining to the degree of government regulation of EBIs; and introduces new models and the theory of Willingness-to-Comply for Equity-Based-Incentives (EBIs). The major findings of this study are that: a) its most efficient to regulate EBIs with one set of laws and a combination of civil and criminal laws; b) the degree of government regulation of EBIs and the penalty regime (criminal or civil) for illegal activities in EBI-related matters should be variable and should depend on several key factors such as company size and employee tenure; c) an index of Willingness-To-Comply is developed which reflected both group-level and company-level dynamics.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
