Abstract
This paper reports on a set of experiments designed to discriminate among the possible sources of the failure of the unique mixed strategy minimax equilibrium of the O'Neill (1987) game. This is accomplished by introducing a new methodology for eliciting mixed strategies, which overcomes some of the difficulties encountered by previous experimental studies. The results clearly show that subjects' choices do not coincide with their minimax strategies, and that players' intended behavior is not minimax. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
