Abstract
We consider two‐tier competing supply chains wherein downstream firms are engaged in mixed (Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot) competition and one downstream firm horizontally holds the rival firm's profit. Our results show that the type of mixed competition plays a crucial role in determining pricing and quantity decisions. The acquiring supply chain member's profit may be lower than the rival chain in Cournot–Bertrand retail competition. However, in Bertrand–Cournot retail competition, the upstream firm's profit of acquired supply chain is always higher, but the downstream firm's profit may be lower than the acquiring supply chain.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
