Abstract

This paper describes how to design and implement a mechanism that helps to mitigate sensor attacks on industrial control systems. The proposed architecture is based on concepts from fault-tolerant control techniques. This short note explains how a Kalman filter can be used simultaneously with optimal disturbance decoupling observers to improve the performance of the mitigation mechanism for sensor attacks in cyber-physical control systems. Our proposal mitigates attacks by generating a signal that compensates the change provoked by the attacker, while at the same time reducing the number of false alarms. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposal using a three tanks control simulation.

Highlights

  • Widespread growth of new computing and network technologies has permeated industrial control systems (ICS), facilitating the pervasive use of remote sensors, and their interconnection with centralized control systems

  • It is important to mention that fault-tolerant control (FTC) technology is being used as a tool for dealing with cyber-attacks [16], [17]; even these works that leverage the fault-tolerant literature focus on detection and isolation, mainly using unknown input observers (UIOs), they do not state how to mitigate these attacks

  • SIMULATION RESULTS we show some results from applying the mitigation mechanism proposed in Section III to an existing feedback control system which faces false data injection attacks

Read more

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Widespread growth of new computing and network technologies has permeated industrial control systems (ICS), facilitating the pervasive use of remote sensors, and their interconnection with centralized control systems. It is important to mention that fault-tolerant control (FTC) technology is being used as a tool for dealing with cyber-attacks [16], [17]; even these works that leverage the fault-tolerant literature focus on detection and isolation, mainly using unknown input observers (UIOs), they do not state how to mitigate these attacks. Motivated by this gap in the literature, our previous work looked at the few proposals that focused on response to cyberattacks and identified two types of responses: (i) preventive and (ii) reactive [18].

BACKGROUND
CYBER-ATTACKS IN CONTROL SYSTEMS
ANOMALY DETECTION AND ISOLATION
PREVENTING ISOLATION BECAUSE OF FALSE ALERTS
CONTROL ACTION COMPENSATION
SIMULATION RESULTS
THREE-TANKS BENCHMARK
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.