Abstract
Abstract Chapter 9 describes the confusion over postwar planning inside the Bush administration and details the incompetent execution of postwar occupation policy by US military commanders (especially General Tommy Franks), the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (led by Jay Garner), and the Coalition Provisional Authority (led by Paul Bremer). It highlights the chaos and turbulence inside Iraq stemming from the American decisions regarding the dismantling of the Iraqi Army, the de-Ba’thification of Iraqi institutions, the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Authority, and the contraction of postwar US occupation forces. It assigns responsibility for the failures primarily to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. Bush.
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