Missile Defence, the ABM Treaty, and Nuclear Weapons--An Opportunity Missed

Abstract

The contention that current US policy settings on missile defence, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM treaty), and strategic nuclear weapons signal the end of the Cold War and lay the foundations for a new strategic framework is premature. Against the background of withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the missile defence programme offers little assurance to Russia and China that it will be limited to the threat from 'rogue' states. More particularly, the US position on nuclear weapons reveals the strength of entrenched Cold War thinking. A clear opportunity to lead the world decisively away from high-salience nuclear postures has been missed. The paper outlines approaches to missile defence and nuclear weapons that offer a better fit with the various objectives of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, revitalising non-proliferation, and providing defences against limited but undeterrable missile threats. The paper also argues that the new focus of intense concern--the theft of weapons of mass destruction or their component materials by terrorists--could be the trigger to bolder thinking on nuclear weapons than has been displayed to date.