Misperceptions, the Media, and the Iraq War

Abstract

The Iraq war and its aftermath have raised compelling questions about the capacity of the executive branch to elicit public consent for the use of military force and about the role the media plays in this process. From the outset, the Bush administration was faced with unique challenges in its effort to legitimate its decision to go to war. Because the war was not prompted by an overt act against the United States or its interests, and was not approved by the UN Security Council, the Bush administration argued that the war was necessary on the basis of a potential threat. Because the evidence for this threat was not fully manifest, the Bush administration led the public to believe that Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and providing substantial support to the al Qaeda terrorist group. The challenge for the administration was later intensified when the United States occupied Iraq and was unable to find the expected corroborating evidence. From the outset the public was sympathetic to the idea of removing Saddam Hussein, though only a small minority of Americans was ready to go to war with Iraq without UN Security Council approval.' The majority was inclined to believe that Iraq had a WMD program and was supporting al Qaeda. However,