Abstract
The paper evaluates the contribution of Robert Sack's book Conceptions of space in social thought (Conceptions) to the philosophical basis of geography. After briefly outlining some of the main themes, it is argued that Conceptions is flawed in its treat- ment of both (natural) scientific conceptions of space and societal conceptions. In the first case, by diluting his application of realist ideas about science with positivist preoccupations with 'generalisations' and empirical regularities, Sack seriously weakens his critique of the representation of space in 'spatial science', and sets up unattainable goals for empirical research. The main part of the paper deals with societal and social scientific conceptions of space, where it is argued that Sack's dualism of subjectivity and objectivity makes it impossible to understand social phenomena, whether they be science, other cultures, literature or art. In dealing with these latter objects, Conceptions has a humanistic flavour and yet it endorses the anti-humanistic approach of behavioural geography as a method. This paradox is resolved by arguing that most humanistic geography shows the same false dualism of subjectivity and objectivity and consequently faces similar limitations. It is therefore claimed that the critique of Conceptions has much wider implications for human geography as a whole.
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