Abstract

Freud is often negatively contrasted with object relations and relational theorists for holding to a metapsychology in which drives are understood as innate and predetermined in their development, are thought to follow the pleasure principle in a "hydraulic" manner, and are not seen as influenced by real objects. While that theory is certainly one dimension of Freud's thinking, it is paralleled by another, quite different model positing a "mirror" relation in which affectively charged reversible self-object dyads, as opposed to purely internal dynamics, are the constituent elements of mental life. This view, more compatible with theories placing greater emphasis on the constitutive role of self-object relations, may further the reconciliation of Freudian and object-relational theories.

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