Abstract
When, and under what circumstances, are congressional minority parties capable of influencing legislative outcomes? We argue that the capacity of the minority party to exert legislative influence is a function of three factors: constraints on the majority party, which create opportunities for the minority party; minority party cohesion on the issue at hand; and sufficient motivation for the minority to engage in legislating rather than electioneering. Drawing on data on every bill considered in the House of Representatives between 1985 and 2006 and case examples of notable lawmaking efforts during the same period, we show that our theory helps predict which bills are considered on the House floor, which bills become law, and the substance of policy-making outcomes. Our findings have important implications for theories of congressional party power and our understanding of minority party influence on Capitol Hill.
Highlights
We find that bills dealing with issues where minority party capacity is greater are more likely to be considered on the House floor
We present several case examples that demonstrate the value of our theory for explaining minority party influence over lawmaking outcomes and the substance of policy, including cases not well explained by existing theories focused on majority party power
Consistent with our theory, we focus on presidential leadership, and expect to find that the minority party is motivated to legislate on issues that are priorities to the president during congresses when the House minority party controls the White House
Summary
We argue that minority party capacity in Congress is a function of three factors: constraints on the majority party, which create opportunities for the minority; minority party cohesion on the issue at hand; and the minority party’s motivation to engage in legislating rather than electioneering. Fully unified behind advancing their economic stimulus package (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), Senate Democrats negotiated with three moderate Republicans—Susan Collins (R-ME), Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and Arlen Specter (R-PA)— giving them just enough votes to secure cloture.12 Unable to hold their members together, the minority Republicans could neither block nor push for broader changes to the Democrats’ plan. Short of the votes needed to pass their class-action lawsuit overhaul on their own, the majority Republicans were able to pick off about one-quarter of Democratic lawmakers in both chambers, making limited concessions along the way.14 In this case, as in the others, the minority party had less capacity to influence the ultimate legislative outcomes because they were unable to hold together, even though there were clear constraints on the majority party. Minorities able to hold together against the majority party’s legislative efforts can block action or demand substantial concessions, especially when the majority is more constrained
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