Abstract

This article explores the manifestations and effects of anti-Muslim hostility in the United States, asking how anti-Muslim hostility affects the nature of American Muslim participation in public life. It argues that cultural trauma among American Muslim communities, resulting from an expectation of routine harm, conditions the nature of participation in public life undertaken by many American Muslims. Drawing on original datasets documenting anti-Muslim hostility and outreach efforts undertaken by American Muslim communities, we can see that ministering to non-Muslim fears has become a central element of participation in public life. This burden of “humanization” pushes us to consider central elements of American “freedom mythologies” around public life and to ask what responsibility non-Muslims have in advocacy work on behalf of American Muslim communities.

Highlights

  • Incidences of public anti-Muslim hostility in the United States rose exponentially in late 2015 and continued at significantly heightened rates through the end of 2017, the date range under consideration in this article.1 Anti-Muslim hostility include an incredible variety of things: nasty encounters in line at stores, vandalism of mosques and Muslim-owned businesses, harassment, assault, murder, public campaigns against mosque construction, Qur’an desecrations, anti-Muslim curriculum reform, local and state-wide regulatory and legislative efforts across the country targeting Muslim communities in a variety of ways, school bullying, and instances of anti-Muslim national political discourse and policies

  • The data I have collected from news sites about the conditions of public life for American Muslims has led me to the conclusion that we must ask critical questions about core elements of America’s “freedom mythology.”

  • This work is a reflection of American Muslims striving to be good people—outreach efforts in the wake of natural or human-made disasters, for example. (Though even here communities will often strategize about how to represent what they are doing to non-Muslim audiences.). Much more often it seems like humanizing work is a direct response to conditions of anti-Muslim hostility; individuals and communities who feel the need to convince others that they are not a threat. During this period, according to data from Mapping Islamophobia, 82% of documented American Muslim participation in public life was of the humanizing variety; 13% involved American Muslims running for political office, whether local, state, or national; and 5% involved Muslim communities— outside of advocacy organizations—reaching out to elected officials

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

Incidences of public anti-Muslim hostility in the United States rose exponentially in late 2015 and continued at significantly heightened rates through the end of 2017, the date range under consideration in this article. Anti-Muslim hostility include an incredible variety of things: nasty encounters in line at stores, vandalism of mosques and Muslim-owned businesses, harassment, assault, murder, public campaigns against mosque construction, Qur’an desecrations, anti-Muslim curriculum reform, local and state-wide regulatory and legislative efforts across the country targeting Muslim communities in a variety of ways, school bullying, and instances of anti-Muslim national political discourse and policies. As I note, the data I have collected represents only those incidents that receive media attention from reputable news sources.) A number, cannot alone communicate the effects of anti-Muslim activity on the conditions of public life for American Muslims. Much more often it seems like humanizing work is a direct response to conditions of anti-Muslim hostility; individuals and communities who feel the need to convince others that they are not a threat During this period, according to data from Mapping Islamophobia, 82% of documented American Muslim participation in public life was of the humanizing variety; 13% involved American Muslims running for political office, whether local, state, or national; and 5% involved Muslim communities— outside of advocacy organizations—reaching out to elected officials. This offers some important hope for improved conditions of public life for American Muslims

CONCLUSION
Findings
There are a number of essays in The FBI and Religion

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