Abstract
We investigate an assignment market where multiple objects are assigned, together with associated payments, to a group of agents with unit demand preferences. Preferences over bundles, pairs of (object, payment), accommodate income effects. Among all (Walrasian) equilibria in such a market, there is one supported by coordinate-wise minimum prices, minimum price equilibrium (MPE). We propose a price adjustment the Vickrey process, that finds an MPE in a finite number of steps. The Vickrey process introduces objects one by one, and on basis of structural properties of MPE, Serial Vickrey sub-process sequentially finds an MPE for k+1 objects by using an MPE for k objects. In Vickrey instead of revealing whole preference, each agent only reports finitely many indifference prices. We also discuss application of Vickrey process to calibrate agents' utility functions in quantitative analysis of housing market research in assignment model.
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