Abstract
This paper investigates if professional players follow the Minimax theorem in their strategies, using Major League Baseball playoff season data. Our empirical results show that baseball players do not optimize their strategies in the sense that their sequence of chosen strategies is predictable from their previous actions. Further analysis using individual salaries and other key contract variables indicates that more experience leads to players conducting strategies following Minimax. By contrast, a higher salary decreases a player's incentive to pursue optimal strategies and brings lower performance. We find the results to have strong implications for compensation practices in various fields.
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