Mind-Reading: Privacy Attacks Exploiting Cross-App KeyEvent Injections

Abstract

AbstractInput Method Editor (IME) has been widely installed on mobile devices to help user type non-Latin characters and reduce the number of key presses. To improve the user experience, popular IMEs integrate personalized features like reordering suggestion list of words based on user’s input history, which inevitably turn them into the vaults of user’s secret. In this paper, we make the first attempt to evaluate the security implications of IME personalization and the back-end infrastructure on Android devices. In the end, we identify a critical vulnerability lying under the Android KeyEvent processing framework, which can be exploited to launch cross-app KeyEvent injection (CAKI) attack and bypass the app-isolation mechanism. By abusing such design flaw, an adversary is able to harvest entries from the personalized user dictionary of IME through an ostensibly innocuous app only asking for common permissions. Our evaluation over a broad spectrum of Android OSes, devices, and IMEs suggests such issue should be fixed immediately. All Android versions and most IME apps are vulnerable and private information, like contact names, location, etc., can be easily exfiltrated. Up to hundreds of millions of mobile users are under this threat. To mitigate this security issue, we propose a practical defense mechanism which augments the existing KeyEvent processing framework without forcing any change to IME apps.KeywordsMobile securitySmart IMEPrivacy leakageSystem flaw