Abstract
This article examines why the decades-old Moro insurgency in Mindanao, southern Philippines, has remained difficult to resolve, and how recent international developments, such as the jihadization of once secular ethno-nationalist movements and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have influenced it. The author argues that jihadism made significant inroads in the Moro nationalist struggle already in the 1990s, way before 9/11, and that since 2007, a more moderate Islamism has gained ascendancy. He argues further that the Moro insurgency has remained intractable because of grave errors committed by the Arroyo and Aquino administrations; recurrent outbursts of anti-Moro hysteria incited by demagogic politicians; and a continuing weak third-party role in the Mindanao peace process. He warns that the apparent collapse of the most recent peace pact between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) poses the danger of the possible rise of new ISIS-linked jihadist groups.
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