Abstract

Representation is at the heart of the study and practice of democratic politics. This article uses a multilevel model to explain differences across new post-communist democracies in the representation gap between the public’s policy preferences and perceptions of government policy activity. Three explanations of differences in the gap are considered: (a) principal-agent theory, which highlights the informational and sanctioning capacities of citizens and how these may be affected by institutional arrangements, particularly by presidentialism; (b) economic performance, which highlights the importance of economic expectations and state economic capacity; and (c) culture-ideology, which highlights citizens’ views of representative democracy per se. For new democracies, where the public had limited democratic experience, suffered considerable economic hardship, and often expressed antirepresentational views of democracy, individual-level and institutional factors associated with citizens’ informational and sanctioning capacities appear to have significantly greater explanatory power.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call